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I. INTRODUCTION 
A young couple shares a romantic dinner at a posh, softly lit restau-
rant. Having just finished dessert, the young man rises from the table, 
reaches into his pocket, and removes a small velvet-wrapped jewelry box 
as he drops to one knee. Opening the box and his mouth to issue a mar-
riage proposal, he is interrupted by the vocal stylings of Nazareth issuing 
from a mobile telephone stashed in a purse under a nearby table: 
   Love hurts, love scars 
   Love wounds, and mars 
   Ooh, ooh, love hurts.1 
Has the young couple been victimized by fate or merely subjected 
to a public performance of Nazareth’s work? While the question of fate 
is beyond the scope of this Note, the question of what constitutes a public 
performance was recently addressed by the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of New York.2 
In the case of In re Cellco Partnership, the “Ringtone Decision,” 
the court held that a ringtone does not constitute a public performance for 
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 1. BOUDLEAUX BRYANT & FELICE BRYANT, Love Hurts, on HAIR OF THE DOG (A&M Records 
1975). 
 2. In re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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which a mobile carrier must acquire a license.3 But to reach its decision, 
the court had to grapple with precedent that is difficult to reconcile.4 The 
court interpreted “public performance” under the Copyright Act5 one 
way in one context, and a different way in another context.6 This mallea-
ble interpretation dependent on context is reminiscent of Professor Jessi-
ca Litman’s statement: 
There are moves that copyright lawyers make when the law isn’t 
working well for them. They avoid inconvenient statutory language 
by persuading courts that the words of the statute mean one thing in 
one context and a different thing in another context. . . . Copyright 
lawyers sit down with other copyright lawyers and negotiate a series 
of band-aid solutions in which they agree to behave with one anoth-
er as if the statute on the books said what they wished it said.7 
The Ringtone Decision is one such “band-aid solution” and indicates that 
we are due for another “wholesale copyright revision.”8 
But the Ringtone Decision reveals another flaw in our current copy-
right regime. The copyright system is flawed because songwriters are 
increasingly separated from their works, leaving copyright disputes to be 
litigated between copyright intermediaries.9 This separation is caused by 
the increasing vertical integration10 of the music industry: four multina-
                                                 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Stephen M. Kramarsky, Defining Public Performance in Digital Transmission Age, 
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 17, 2009, at 5 (stating that Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 
121 (2d Cir. 2008), and Nat’l Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 
2000), “are, in fact, difficult to reconcile entirely”). 
 5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (2006). 
 6. Compare Nat’l Football League, 211 F.3d at 13 (satellite transmissions are public perfor-
mances), with Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 123 (transmissions to digital video recording devices 
are not). 
 7. Jessica Litman, The Copyright Revision Act of 2026, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 249, 
250 (2009) (citing William S. Strauss, Study No. 29: Protection of Unpublished Works 8–15, in 1 
STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 187, 198–205 (1963)). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 18 (2010) (differentiating 
between copyright interests for “creators,” “readers,” and “intermediaries”). 
 10. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 33 (Princeton Univ. Press 
2007) (1967) (“The market is superseded by vertical integration. The planning unit takes over the 
source of supply or the outlet; a transaction that is subject to bargaining over prices and amounts is 
thus replaced with a transfer within the planning unit.”). For an entertaining illustration of vertical 
integration, see 30 Rock: Let’s Stay Together (NBC television broadcast Oct. 7, 2010). The episode 
contains the following dialogue: 
Jack: The only thing I will be discussing with the House Subcommittee on Baseball, Quiz 
Shows, Terrorism, and Media is vertical integration. 
Liz: What’s vertical integration? 
Jack: Imagine that your favorite corn chip manufacturer also owned the number one di-
arrhea medication. 
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tional media corporations receive a majority of global music revenues 
from copyright. With the intended beneficiaries of copyright—artists and 
the public—arguably absent from the courtroom, the court could not 
reach a satisfactory result. If the court held for the cellular telephone 
companies, it would award them a windfall by allowing them to profit 
from the performance of works without paying royalties. But if the court 
held for the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers 
(ASCAP), it would disgorge profits of cellular-telephone innovation and 
award much of the profits to corporate interests that, through the vertical 
integration of the music industry, have substantially divorced songwriters 
from equitable remuneration for their creative work. The court was 
doomed to fail in reconciling an aging Copyright Act with rapidly devel-
oping technology and a music industry colored by collective dominance. 
As we enter a new period of wholesale copyright revision, this Note 
examines the interplay of copyright and technology through a brief ex-
ploration of the Ringtone Decision. Part II of the Note explores the histo-
ry of copyright reform, the music industry, and performance-rights or-
ganizations. Part III explores the Ringtone Decision and reveals that the 
decision is symptomatic of both a Copyright Act and music industry in 
need of reform, and is at odds with the normative value of copyright as 
an incentive for creators. Part IV explores how we should restore this 
normative value by rebalancing the bargaining power of songwriters and 
the vertically integrated music industry. It further argues that the appro-
priate rebalancing can occur by amending the Copyright Act with two 
provisions inspired by German copyright law: First, our Copyright Act 
should have a contract-reformation provision for instances in which a 
copyright transferee benefits disproportionately from new technology. 
And second, our Copyright Act should offer a limited reversionary right 
to the creator when a copyright transferee opts not to exploit the work 
through new technology. Part V concludes the Note. 
II. COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION AND THE VERTICALLY INTEGRATED 
MUSIC INDUSTRY 
On October 19, 1976, the current Copyright Act was signed into 
law.11 Ford was President,12 “Disco Duck” topped the Billboard charts,13 
                                                                                                             
Liz: That’d be great ’cause then they could put a little sample of the medicine in each 
bag. 
Jack: Keep thinking. 
Liz: Except then they might be tempted to make the corn chips give you . . . 
Jack: Vertical integration. 
Id. 
 11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). 
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and the cassette was on its way toward eclipsing the LP as the most pop-
ular medium for music delivery.14 Today, despite several amendments, 
the Copyright Act remains largely in its 1976 form. Far from the days of 
“Disco Duck” and the choice between cassette and LP, today’s consumer 
can purchase Beyoncé’s album, I am . . . Sasha Fierce, in one of more 
than 260 formats.15 As a result, courts are struggling to apply the Copy-
right Act to technologies unimaginable at the time of the Act’s drafting. 
To understand where copyright reform for music is headed, we 
must understand its history. Section A of this Part explores the legislative 
process traditionally used to enact copyright reform generally and re-
views the development of public performance rights throughout the his-
tory of the Copyright Act in particular. Section B explores the vertical 
integration of the music industry that has accompanied legislative 
reform. And section C analyzes the role of performance-rights organiza-
tions—particularly ASCAP—in the music industry. 
A. The Legislative Process in Copyright Reform and the  
Development of the Public Performance Right 
Prior to 1856, the Copyright Act provided protection only for re-
production and distribution rights.16 In 1856, the first federal public per-
formance right was granted, and authors of “dramatic compositions” ob-
tained “the sole right ‘to act, perform, or represent their work or cause it 
to be acted, performed, or represented.’”17 The public performance right 
was extended from dramatic compositions to musical compositions in 
1897.18 
Copyright law continued to develop in tandem with technological 
discoveries that expanded the economic potential of creative works. The 
popularity of the piano roll,19 for example, led to a larger market for mus-
ical works in the early twentieth century.20 Manufacturing companies 
                                                                                                             
 12. Frank Lynn, Carter’s Forces, in Effort to Recoup in New York, Stress City’s Problems, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1976, at 1. 
 13. Hot 100 for the Week of October 16, 1976, BILLBOARD.COM, http://www.billboard.com/#/ 
charts/hot-100?chartDate=1976-10-16 (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 14. Rebecca MacQuarrie et al., The History of Recorded Music: 1960s–1980s, http://www.soc. 
duke.edu/~s142tm01/history4.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 15. INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2010, at 4 (2010) 
[hereinafter IFPI 2010], available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2010.pdf. 
 16. 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 14:3 (2011). 
 17. Id. (quoting Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (supplemental to Act to Amend the 
Several Acts Respecting Copyright)). 
 18. Id. 
 19. A piano roll is “a roll, usually of paper, on which music is preserved in the form of perfora-
tions; it is recorded and played back mechanically on a player piano or pianola.” THE NEW GROVE 
DICTIONARY OF JAZZ 985 (Barry Kernfeld ed., 2d ed. 1994). 
 20. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 23 (2d ed. 2006). 
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began reproducing songs through the distribution of thousands of piano 
rolls without authorization from composers.21 Composers sought a judi-
cial remedy to the exploitation of their work without proper compensa-
tion.22 But the Court held that songwriters were not entitled to revenue 
from the sale of piano rolls because piano rolls were not really “copies” 
of a musical work.23 
In response to the lobbying efforts of composers and others inter-
ested in a piece of the expanding copyright pie, Congress set about re-
forming American copyright law by tasking representatives of songwri-
ters, publishers, and manufacturers with crafting legislation that would 
appeal to all represented interests.24 The 1909 Copyright Act was the re-
sult; it established a compulsory mechanical license for reproductions of 
music.25 The compulsory mechanical license allowed piano-roll manu-
facturers to use copyrighted works without permission of the rights hold-
er, but the manufacturer was obligated to pay the rights holder a statuto-
rily determined fee for the use.26 
In the 1909 Act, Congress extended copyright protection beyond 
dramatic and musical compositions to additional genres of work, and 
Congress limited protection of musical compositions to for-profit per-
formances.27 In interpreting the Act, the Court would later adopt a broad 
construction of the phrase “for profit,” acknowledging that copyright 
infringement is not limited to performances “where money is taken at the 
door.”28 In the Court’s view, “performances [that] are not eleemosy-
nary . . . are part of a total for which the public pays.”29 
The task of applying the 1909 Act to new innovations fell to the Ju-
diciary because the Legislature could not anticipate not-yet-invented 
technologies. For example, the development of the “word roll,” a piano 
roll with lyrics printed next to the roll’s perforations, was unanticipated 
                                                 
 21. Sara K. Stadler, Performance Values, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 697, 708–09 (2008). 
 22. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1908). 
 23. Id. at 18. 
 24. LITMAN, supra note 20, at 38. Because of highly technical aspects of industries affected by 
the Copyright Act, Congress originally resolved that the Library of Congress would convene a con-
ference of experts to offer advice regarding codification of copyright laws. The original conference 
of industry insiders excluded representatives of the piano-roll and “talking machine,” or phonograph, 
industries. Not surprisingly, early drafts of the legislation disfavored the unrepresented industries, 
making the unlicensed manufacture of piano rolls or phonographs illegal. The piano-roll and phono-
graph manufacturers bitterly opposed the draft legislation, and so, the legislation did not receive a 
vote in Congress. Id. at 38–39. 
 25. Id. at 40. 
 26. 1 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT §§ 5.5, 5.16 (2010). 
 27. Stadler, supra note 21, at 705. 
 28. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594 (1917). 
 29. Id. 
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by negotiators of the 1909 Act.30 Thus, the Judiciary had to determine 
whether the inclusion of lyrics on a piano roll constituted infringement of 
the lyricist’s copyright under the language of the 1909 Act.31 
In the decades that followed the 1909 Act, developments in tech-
nology widened the economic potential in copyright, which created a 
desire for reform among traditional members of and newcomers to the 
music industry. In response to industry lobbying and a proposal from 
Congress to revise the 1909 Act, the Register of Copyrights issued a re-
port in 1961 voicing its concern about various proposed alterations to the 
structure of the 1909 Act.32 In particular, the Register’s report addressed 
new modes of identifying public performance exemptions.33 According 
to the report, an attempt to specify discrete categories of exempt perfor-
mance—such as religious, educational, and charitable performances—
would likely result in uncertainty regarding exempt performances and an 
overly broad or narrow interpretation of the exemption.34 Despite the 
Register’s advice, the first draft of the bill presented two alternatives to 
the definition of a public performance right: (1) a continuation of the 
1909 Act conception of the public performance right extending only to 
for-profit performances,35 and (2) a broad, general public performance 
right limited by specifically iterated categories of exemption.36 
In revising the bill, the Register made a number of recommenda-
tions to clarify the definition of “public performance.”37 In response to 
evolving technology, the Register expressed that acts transmitting or re-
producing an initial performance constituted an additional performance.38 
The Register also stated that codifying the phrase “either directly or by 
means of any device or process” as part of the definition would encom-
                                                 
 30. LITMAN, supra note 20, at 47. 
 31. Standard Music Roll Co. v. F.A. Mills, Inc., 241 F. 360, 363 (3d Cir. 1917). Apparently, it 
did. Id. 
 32. 4 PATRY, supra note 16, § 14:11. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE 
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (1961)). 
 35. Protected public performances would include those “given with the expectation of direct or 
indirect commercial advantage, or if any part of the proceeds, after deducting the reasonable costs of 
the performance, will be used for private financial gain.” 4 PATRY, supra note 16, § 14:12 (quoting 
Copyright Law Revision Part 3, Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S. Copyright Law and Discussions 
and Comments on the Draft, § 5(c)(4), Alternative A at 5 (Sept. 1964)). Under the 1909 Act, the 
broad definition of for-profit performances included performances in a restaurant or hotel without 
charge, Herbert v. Stanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 593 (1917), and included piping music into hotel 
rooms from a master radio receiving set at no additional charge, Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 
283 U.S. 191, 202 (1931), but would exclude “the owner of a private radio receiving set who in his 
own home invites friends to hear a musical composition which is being broadcast,” id. 
 36. 4 PATRY, supra note 16, § 14:12. 
 37. Id. § 14:14. 
 38. Id. (quoting S. 1006, H.R. 4347, H.R. 5680, H.R. 6831, H.R. 6835, 89th Cong. (1965)). 
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pass new means of reproducing or amplifying initial performances, in-
cluding “a host of . . . techniques, undoubtedly . . . some not invented 
yet.”39 
After a twenty-year negotiating process, Congress passed the 1976 
Copyright Act, which reflected an industry compromise similar to the 
1909 Act.40 As a result of complex negotiations, the 1976 Act is a leng-
thy, complex piece of legislation. Rather than enacting simple, broad, 
and flexible provisions that might stand the test of time, the legislation 
contains language narrowly tailored for the interests of the industry rep-
resentatives who crafted the legislation.41 
For instance, Congress adopted the second of the Register’s pro-
posed public performance definitions, abandoning the for-profit defini-
tion of public performance protection and, instead, codifying extensive 
exceptions to the broad public performance right.42 Congress included 
the “device or process” language in its definition of “perform.”43 Con-
gress also codified a definition of performing “publicly.”44 The second of 
Congress’s two-pronged definition of “public” centers on the transmitter 
rather than the recipient of a performance because the transmission con-
stitutes a performance “whether the members of the public capable of 
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or in 
separate places and at the same time or at different times.”45 The defini-
tion, therefore, includes within its “public” scope transmissions and re-
transmissions of performances to recipients in private places and does 
not require proof that a member of the public actually took in the per-
formance at the time of transmission.46 
                                                 
 39. Id. (quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 22 (1965)). 
 40. LITMAN, supra note 20, at 51. 
 41. Id. at 57. 
 42. 4 PATRY, supra note 16, §§ 14:20–:30. 
 43. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“To ‘perform’ a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act 
it, either directly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audi-
ble.”) (emphasis added). 
 44. Id. (“To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means—(1) to perform or display it at a place 
open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of 
a family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or (2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a 
performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of 
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or 
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different times.”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. 4 PATRY, supra note 16, § 14:28. For example, radio and television broadcasts constitute 
public performances even in the absence of proof that a radio or television was powered on and 
receiving the transmission. Id. 
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These public performance protections apply only to “literary, musi-
cal, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pic-
tures and other audiovisual works.”47 It was not until the Digital Perfor-
mance Act of 1995 (DPA) that sound recordings were extended some 
public performance protection.48 Before the DPA, public performance 
rights were reserved only in the musical composition underlying the re-
cording. For example, the publisher that owns the right of public perfor-
mance in “Disco Duck” receives royalty payments when the sound re-
cording is played in public, but the record company that produced the 
song had no potential royalty in the public performance until passage of 
the DPA. The DPA extended sole rights for public performance “by 
means of a digital audio transmission” to copyright holders of sound re-
cordings.49 Analog sound recording transmissions remain exempt, result-
ing in an “absence of liability for terrestrial radio.”50 The result of this 
fractured performance right is that web-based radio services providing 
digital audio transmission must license use of a song from both the copy-
right holder of the sound recording and the copyright holder of the musi-
cal composition, while terrestrial radio broadcasters need only license 
use from the copyright holder of the musical composition.51 
An exploration of the history of copyright reform generally, and the 
public performance right in particular, illustrates that the industry-
compromise method of legislating leaves much to be wanted. Just as in-
dustry representatives negotiating the 1909 Act could not predict the de-
velopment of the word roll, parties to the development of the 1976 Act 
undoubtedly never considered that members of the public would ulti-
mately carry small telephones into busy restaurants that would signal an 
incoming call by broadcasting a digital audio recording of a copyrighted 
musical work. The industry-compromise method of copyright reform 
likely necessitates band-aid solutions like the Ringtone Decision. 
If historical trends are any indication, we are due for another gener-
ation of the Copyright Act.52 Similar to the development of the phono-
graph and the player piano, the availability of digital media has trans-
formed the way in which the public interacts with music. From 2003 to 
                                                 
 47. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006). 
 48. The protection granted was very limited. 4 PATRY, supra note 16, § 14:29. 
 49. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006). 
 50. 4 PATRY, supra note 16, § 14:29. Terrestrial radio is radio broadcast from land-based tow-
ers. ANNABEL Z. DODD, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS 9 (3d ed. 2002). 
 51. Emily F. Evitt, Money, That’s What I Want: The Long & Winding Road to a Public Per-
formance Right in Sound Recordings, 8 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 11 (2009). Companion bills 
H.R. 848 and S. 379, the Performing Rights Act, were reintroduced in 2009 and would eliminate 
terrestrial radio’s exemption from paying royalties to copyright holders of sound recordings. Owen J. 
Sloane & Rachel M. Stilwell, The Case for the Performing Rights Act, L.A. LAW., May 2009, at 52. 
 52. See Litman, supra note 7, at 257. 
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2007, consumption of music in the United States increased by one-
third.53 In 2008, there were 1.5 billion music purchases in the United 
States,54 and the digital share of the music market jumped to thirty-nine 
percent.55 As in the periods preceding the 1909 and 1976 Acts, the eco-
nomic contours of copyright are changing. The question remains whether 
the industry-compromise method of legislating will continue to inform 
Congress’s revisions of the Copyright Act.56 
But there is another culprit besides our current legislative regime 
that might be the cause of copyright not working for its intended benefi-
ciaries. The next section explores that potential cause. 
B. The Vertical Integration of the Music Industry 
The vast majority of copyrights are held by a small number of cor-
porate entities. Estimates show that global revenues for the music indus-
try exceeded $15.5 billion in 2009, with the digital share of market reve-
nues estimated at $4.2 billion.57 Four companies hold copyrights for se-
venty to eighty percent of global music revenues: EMI Music Publishing, 
Warner/Chappell Music, Sony/ATV Music Publishing, and Universal 
Music Publishing Group.58 
One reason for the consolidation of global copyright revenues in a 
handful of multinational media corporations is the vertical integration of 
the music industry.59 Vertical integration occurs when different parts of 
the industry’s value chain have the same owner, such as when a record 
company purchases a publishing company.60 Formerly, music publishers 
benefitted from copyrights in the musical composition, and record pro-
                                                 
 53. INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2009, at 4 (2009), 
available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2009-real.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 7. 
 56. See Litman, supra note 7, at 249. 
 57. See IFPI 2010, supra note 15, at 4. 
 58. Ulrik Volgsten & Yngve Åkerberg, Copyright, Music, and Morals: Artistic Expression and 
the Public Sphere, in MUSIC AND MANIPULATION: ON THE SOCIAL USES AND SOCIAL CONTROL OF 
MUSIC 336, 355 (Steven Brown & Ulrik Volgsten eds., 2006). Volgsten & Åkerberg state that five 
multinational companies own copyrights for seventy to eighty percent of global music revenues, 
including Bertelsmann/BMG Music Publishing. Id. The number of companies is now reduced to four 
as Universal purchased BMG Publishing in 2006 and Sony purchased Bertelsmann’s half of the 
Sony BMG joint venture in 2008. Ethan Smith, Sony to Take Over Music Partnership: Firm Raises 
Its Bet on Ailing Industry; Bertelsmann Exits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/ 
article/SB121793861556313223.html; Universal to Buy BMG Publishing, BBC NEWS, Sept. 6, 
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5319050.stm. 
 59. Roger Wallis, The Changing Structure of the Music Industry: Threats to and Opportunities 
for Creativity, in MUSIC AND MANIPULATION: ON THE SOCIAL USES AND SOCIAL CONTROL OF 
MUSIC, supra note 58, at 287–88. 
 60. Id. at 294. 
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ducer–distributors benefitted from mechanical reproduction copyrights in 
a sound recording. Now, each of the four major publishing companies is 
paired with one of the “Big 4” record companies (Universal, Sony, 
Warner, and EMI), so the parent corporations can benefit from the “bun-
dle” of copyrights in a work.61 
With consolidated control of the music industry comes increased 
control over songwriters. In the past, signing with a major record label 
represented guaranteed wealth, but today, the majority of singer–
songwriters working under major record labels fail to receive an equita-
ble share of the proceeds of their work.62 To garner a contract with a re-
cording company, a singer–songwriter often has to transfer her copy-
rights to a publishing company within the same corporation.63 The public 
performance right at issue in the Ringtone Decision is among the rights a 
singer–songwriter often transfers to a multinational media corporation.64 
C. Origins of ASCAP 
Despite the consolidation of copyright holders in the music market, 
performance-rights organizations continue to act as the collectors of pub-
lic performance royalties. Understanding the origin of performance-
rights organizations helps us understand the Ringtone Decision specifi-
cally, and the need for copyright reform generally. 
As discussed earlier,65 player pianos began to saturate the market at 
the turn of the twentieth century,66 with manufacturing companies repro-
ducing songs through distribution of thousands of piano rolls without 
authorization from the composers.67 The Supreme Court held that piano 
rolls were noninfringing.68 The 1909 Act was, in part, a response to this 
ruling.69 Composers began reaping the benefit of manufactured copies of 
their works through compulsory licensing developed in the 1909 Act, but 
                                                 
 61. Id. 
 62. See JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AFFECTS 
MUSICAL CREATIVITY 144 (2006) (“[T]he majority of artists who work under the majors today end 
up losing money . . . .”); WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP 35 (2004) (“I’ve created 25+ 
albums for major labels, and I’ve never once received a royalty check that didn’t show I owed them 
money.”) (quoting Janis Ian, The Internet Debacle—An Alternative View, JANISIAN.COM (2002), 
http://www.janisian.com/reading/internet.php); see also Litman, supra note 9, at 9–10; Courtney 
Love, Courtney Love Does the Math, SALON.COM, June 14, 2006, http://www.salon.com/ 
technology/feature/2000/06/14/love; Lyle Lovett Sells Millions, Earns Nothing, REUTERS, July 10, 
2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1030835920080710. 
 63. Wallis, supra note 59, at 294. 
 64. See id. at 295. 
 65. See supra Part II.A. 
 66. Stadler, supra note 21, at 708. 
 67. Id. at 708–09. 
 68. Id. at 709. 
 69. Id. 
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no individual composer had the resources to determine when his work 
was being performed without authorization.70 As a result, in 1914, a 
group of prominent composers founded ASCAP with the primary pur-
pose of assuring creators of music fair compensation for the public per-
formance of their works.71 
ASCAP’s aggressive membership efforts72 brought about radio-
broadcaster opposition to the cost of ASCAP licensing.73 In 1941, 
ASCAP was the subject of an antitrust action.74 To settle the suit, 
ASCAP agreed to operate under a consent decree requiring the organiza-
tion to license performance rights to all who seek them.75 The consent 
decree has been modified twice, but it remains in place.76 In the event 
that ASCAP and the party seeking a license cannot agree on a licensing 
fee, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York operates as a rate-setting court and resolves the dispute.77 
Today, ASCAP licenses performance rights to works in its catalog 
primarily through blanket licenses that allow licensees to perform any 
work in the ASCAP catalog as often as they please within the stated 
term.78 The organization subsequently distributes royalties to its member 
copyright holders according to a fee schedule related to the number of 
times the work is performed.79 Celebrating its ninety-fifth year in 2008, 
ASCAP distributed nearly $819 million to its member copyright hold-
ers.80 ASCAP and its fellow performance-rights organization, Broadcast 
Music, Inc., hold “[a]lmost every domestic copyrighted composition [in 
their repertoires].”81 
                                                 
 70. Id. at 710. 
 71. The Birth of ASCAP, ASCAP.COM, http://www.ascap.com/about/history (last visited Mar. 
31, 2011). 
 72. The Age of Radio, ASCAP.COM, http://www.ascap.com/about/history/1920s.html (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 73. The Big Band Era, ASCAP.COM, http://www.ascap.com/about/history/1940s.html (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 74. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, Civ. No. 13-95, 1941 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3944 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 1941). 
 75. Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining in the Shadow of Rate-Setting Courts, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 307, 
310 (2009). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Major Bob Music v. Stubbs, 851 F. Supp. 475, 477 n.1 (S.D. Ga. 1994). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See ASCAP, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2009), available at http://www.ascap.com/about/ 
annualReport/annual_2009.pdf. 
 81. Major Bob Music, 851 F. Supp. at 477 n.1. 
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III. THE RINGTONE DECISION AS BAND-AID 
Recall that when the Copyright Act isn’t working well for lawyers, 
they tend to persuade courts “that the words of the statute mean one thing 
in one context and a different thing in another context.”82 For example, 
the Ringtone Decision bandaged together differing interpretations of 
public performance83 in an effort to address copyright issues in new 
technology. 
On October 14, 2009, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York filed the Ringtone Decision.84 Section A 
of this Part examines the precedent that helped inform the Ringtone De-
cision. Sections B and C compare claims presented by ASCAP and the 
Mobile Carriers.85 Section D explores the court’s resolution of the 
claims. 
A. The Road to the Ringtone Decision 
Three recent opinions help inform an analysis of the Ringtone De-
cision. First, in the “Register’s Opinion,” the Register of Copyrights is-
sued an opinion that the primary purpose of a ringtone is its private use, 
implying that a public performance license is unnecessary.86 Second, in 
the “Download Decision,” the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York established that digital downloads, while al-
most immediately available for playback, do not necessitate a public per-
formance license because the downloads are not “contemporaneously 
perceptible.”87 And third, in the “Preview Decision,” the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York established that a 
blanket license is necessary for ringtone previews streamed via the Web 
or mobile-phone applications because of the commercial purpose of the 
use.88 
                                                 
 82. Litman, supra note 7, at 250. 
 83. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(4) (2006). 
 84. In re Cellco P’ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 85. I use the term “ASCAP” to refer to ASCAP and its amici. I use “Mobile Carriers” to refer 
to AT&T Mobility, Verizon Wireless, and their amici. The court filed a brief opinion granting sum-
mary judgment to AT&T Mobility for “substantially the same reasons” as Verizon in In re AT&T 
Mobility L.L.C., No. 09 Civ. 7072, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123018, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2009). 
 86. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. Reg. 
64,303, 64,316 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006). 
 87. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers (ASCAP I), 485 F. Supp. 
2d 438, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 88. United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers (ASCAP II), 599 F. Supp. 
2d 415, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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1. The Register’s Opinion 
In 2006, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) 
requested an opinion from the Copyright Royalty Board regarding the 
eligibility of ringtones for compulsory mechanical licensing under § 115 
of the Copyright Act.89 The question was posed as a dispute between mu-
sic publishers and the Big 4 record labels that sell ringtones to mobile-
phone companies.90 If ringtones did not qualify for a § 115 mechanical 
license, then record labels would have to negotiate a license with music 
publishers before creating and distributing ringtones to mobile-phone 
companies.91 If ringtones did qualify for mechanical licensure, ringtone 
distributors could secure rights to create and distribute ringtones at a 
lower statutory rate.92 The Copyright Royalty Board referred the issue to 
the Register of Copyrights in the form of two questions: 
(1) Does a ringtone, made available for use on a cellular telephone 
or similar device, constitute delivery of a digital phonorecord that is 
subject to statutory licensing under 17 U.S.C. § 115, irrespective of 
whether the ringtone is monophonic (having only a single melodic 
line), polyphonic (having both melody and harmony), or a master-
tone (a digital sound recording or excerpt thereof)? 
(2) If so, what are the legal conditions and/or limitations on such 
statutory licensing?93 
In its memorandum opinion, the Register of Copyrights answered the 
questions posed.94 First, the Register stated that monophonic and poly-
phonic ringtones, as well as mastertones, constitute digital phonorecord 
deliveries and, therefore, qualify for compulsory mechanical licensing 
under § 115 of the Copyright Act.95 Second, the legal conditions or limi-
tations depend on the nature of the ringtone—namely, whether the ring-
tone is a portion of an original musical work or is a derivative work such 
that it has become an original work of authorship entitled to its own cop-
yright protection.96 
                                                 
 89. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. Reg. 
at 64,303. 
 90. Daniel M. Simon, Note, Cell Phone Ringtones: A Case Study Exemplifying the Complexi-
ties of the § 115 Mechanical License of the Copyright Act of 1976, 57 DUKE L.J. 1865, 1874 (2008). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1875. 
 93. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. Reg. 
at 16,303. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. The opinion, which is not immune from judicial review, has been both praised and 
criticized. See Simon, supra note 90, at 1881 (discussing how the “analysis did not bring clarity to 
this muddled area of law”). The RIAA praised the decision, stating: 
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An important part of the decision was the Register’s analysis of the 
§ 115 limitation of compulsory mechanical licenses to persons making 
phonorecords for distribution “to the public for private use.”97 Music 
publishers argued that ringtones were not for “private use” because the 
end use was often outside the home where members of the public could 
hear the work and served as “a means [for users] to publicly identify and 
express themselves to their friends, colleagues and the public at large.”98 
The Register rejected this position: 
This cannot be what Congress intended. Here, we note that tradi-
tional phonorecords are used in public (e.g., in boom boxes in pub-
lic parks, in a car stereo while the automobile is driving down the 
street, etc.), but that does not disqualify them from the statutory li-
cense by violating their primary purpose of being for private use. 
While it may be true that some mobile phone users purchase ring-
tones to identify themselves in public, this use most likely would 
not be considered a public use as Congress intended that term to be 
understood in the Section 115 context, and in any event, there is no 
basis to conclude that the primary purpose of the ringtone distribu-
tor is to distribute the ringtone for “public” use.99 
As will become clear, this reasoning closely parallels that of the court’s 
in the Ringtone Decision. 
2. The Download Decision 
In the Download Decision, the rate court that resolves royalty con-
flicts under the consent decree for ASCAP’s Sherman Antitrust Act vi-
olations determined that a digital transmission must be contempora-
neously perceptible for it to constitute a public performance.100 ASCAP 
applied to the court because the organization was unable to agree on a 
                                                                                                             
This decision injects clarity into the marketplace—clarity that will help satisfy fans’ hun-
ger for the latest hits from today’s best artists by affording record companies and ringtone 
providers the ability to move new offerings quickly and easily to consumers. Ultimately, 
we’re all seeking a vibrant mobile business. This decision helps us further that goal. 
Press Release, Recording Industry Ass’n of Am., RIAA Statement on Copyright Office Ringtone 
Ruling (Oct. 17, 2006), available at http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?news_month_filter= 
10&news_year_filter=2006&resultpage=&id=FFDA71A6-BC65-F876-E846-114BD14EABE1. 
Conversely, the decision has been criticized: “A compulsory license for ringtones unnecessarily risks 
the artistic integrity and reputation of artists and songwriters who have no meaningful way of opting 
out of the licensing scheme.” Daniel H. Mark, Wringing Songwriters Dry: Negative Consequences of 
Compulsory Licensing for Ringtones, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 533, 541 (2008). 
 97. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2006). 
 98. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. Reg. 
at 64,315. 
 99. Id. at 64,316. 
 100. ASCAP I, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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reasonable licensing fee with AOL, LLC, RealNetworks, Inc., and Ya-
hoo! Inc. for their use of music contained in the ASCAP catalog.101 
ASCAP moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether 
music downloads consist of a public performance as defined by the Cop-
yright Act.102 Relying on statutory construction, analogous case law, and 
secondary authorities, the court concluded that “in order for a song to be 
performed, it must be transmitted in a manner designed for contempora-
neous perception.”103 Online streaming of a musical work, for example, 
does constitute a public performance under this standard.104 Similar to a 
musical “stream,” a song download consists of a digital transmission to 
an end user.105 A performance can occur “publicly” through the transmis-
sion of “any device or process.”106 While a song download enables 
prompt replay, that does not mean that the transmission is “simultaneous-
ly perceptible [rendering it] a performance under the Act.”107 The court 
did not, however, foreclose the possibility that a digital transmission 
could, in certain circumstances, be both a reproduction and a public per-
formance.108 The court’s opinion—particularly its use of a contempora-
neously perceptible standard of public performance—is the subject of 
appeal.109 
3. The Preview Decision 
A similar rate dispute resulted in the rate court’s Preview Deci-
sion.110 ASCAP requested the court determine rates for “interim blanket 
license fees and reasonable final blanket license fees” for AT&T Mobili-
ty’s public performances of works from the ASCAP catalog through its 
website and wireless transmissions.111 The Preview Decision resulted 
from AT&T Mobility’s motion for partial summary judgment on the is-
sue of ringtone and ringback tone previews that it offered via its mobile-
media website and application.112 AT&T Mobility argued that the pre-
                                                 
 101. Id. at 441. 
 102. Id. at 442. 
 103. Id. at 443. 
 104. Id. at 442. 
 105. Id. at 446. 
 106. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 107. ASCAP I, 485 F. Supp. 2d at 446. 
 108. Id. at 447. 
 109. ASCAP’s Opposition to AT&T’s Motion for Summary Judgment Concerning Ringtones 
at 11–12, United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 41-1395 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 14, 2009). 
 110. ASCAP II, 599 F. Supp. 2d 415, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 111. Id. at 419. 
 112. Id. 
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views constituted “fair use” as defined by § 107 of the Copyright Act.113 
ASCAP argued that the previews constituted public performances and, 
thus, should be included in the court’s determination of a reasonable 
blanket license fee.114 In balancing the fair use factors codified in the 
Copyright Act, the court held that AT&T Mobility’s use of works from 
the ASCAP catalog for previews did not constitute fair use.115 
The Register’s Opinion, the Download Decision, and the Preview 
Decision make clear that the Ringtone Decision court could have moved 
in either of two distinct directions—a ringtone is a public performance or 
it isn’t. The Register’s Opinion advised that the primary purpose of a 
ringtone is its private use, implying that a public performance license is 
unnecessary.116 And the Download Decision established that digital 
downloads, while almost immediately available for playback, do not ne-
cessitate a public performance license because the downloads are not 
contemporaneously perceptible.117 But the Preview Decision established 
the necessity of a blanket license for ringtone previews streamed via the 
Web or mobile-phone applications because of the commercial purpose of 
the use. Thus, the court’s Ringtone Decision could determine that a ring-
                                                 
 113. Id. The fair use section of the Copyright Act states: 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the fac-
tors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 114. ASCAP II, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 423. 
 115. Id. at 434. In examining the purpose and character of the use, the court determined that 
AT&T Mobility’s previews were not transformative because, other than selecting only a portion of 
the musical work, the songs were unchanged. Id. at 428. In addition, the court determined that the 
use was commercial in nature, weighing heavily against AT&T Mobility. Id. at 429. While stating 
that the second factor is “rarely found to be determinative,” the court noted that the nature of the 
copyrighted work was undisputedly creative, weighing in favor of ASCAP. Id. at 429–30. The court 
held that the third factor—the amount and substantiality of the portion used—also weighed in favor 
of ASCAP. Id. at 431. That the previews were copied identically from the member works was evi-
dence of the “qualitative value of the copied material.” Id. Thus, while the amount used was tempo-
rally limited, it was markedly substantial because the selection was often the essence of the work. Id. 
at 430–31. The court held that the fourth and final factor was neutral if not weighing in favor of 
ASCAP. Id. at 433. In examining the market effect, the court “recognize[d] the strong possibility 
that ASCAP and its members lose current and future revenue when consumers access free previews 
from a website or wireless application to listen to, and possibly copy, previews of ASCAP music in 
lieu of accessing music segments from sources that pay licensing fees to ASCAP.” Id. at 432–33. 
The court also held that ASCAP created a market for performances of short segments of its music by 
licensing such use to nineteen separate companies. Id. at 432. A finding of fair use would, therefore, 
encroach on “potential licensing revenues from these markets.” Id. 
 116. See Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 64,303, 64,316 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006). 
 117. ASCAP I, 485 F. Supp. 2d 438, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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tone is simply a download: a digital phonorecord that is transmitted 
without contemporaneous perception for private use. Alternatively, the 
court could hold that a ringtone is no different than a preview: a mobile 
transmission to an end user that is commercial in nature and encroaches 
on ASCAP’s established ringtone-licensing market. 
B. ASCAP’s Case: A Ringtone Is a Public Performance 
Delivery of music to mobile devices is rapidly increasing.118 Not 
surprisingly, ASCAP is “leveraging its power for the benefit of [its] 
members” 119 alongside other interest groups and manufacturers attempt-
ing to mark their territory in the expanding digital and mobile music 
markets.120 The Ringtone Decision, similar to the Download Decision, is 
the result of ASCAP pursuing that end. 
ASCAP requested that the rate court determine blanket license fee 
rates for the Mobile Carriers’ public performances of works from the 
ASCAP catalog.121 The parties failed to negotiate a blanket license, so 
the court was asked to establish the royalty rates that the Mobile Carriers 
must pay to acquire blanket licenses.122 The Mobile Carriers moved for 
summary judgment on the issue of whether ringtones constituted public 
performances necessitating performance license fees.123 The Ringtone 
Decision was the ruling on that motion.124 
ASCAP asserted that the initial ringtone transmissions are public 
performances under the Download Decision because the transmissions 
are contemporaneously perceptible performances.125 ASCAP asserted 
that the Mobile Carriers must purchase public performance licenses lest 
the Mobile Carriers directly infringe public performance rights by main-
taining an infrastructure that triggers the audio transmission of copy-
righted works.126 The Mobile Carriers would be secondarily infringing 
ASCAP’s public performance rights by enabling and encouraging an in-
fringing public performance to be carried out by the end user.127 Finally, 
                                                 
 118. Gartner Says Consumer Spending on Mobile Music Will Surpass US$32 Billion by 2010, 
GARTNER, INC., http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=500295 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 119. The ASCAP Millennium, ASCAP.COM, http://www.ascap.com/about/history/2000.html 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2011). 
 120. See Carmen Kate Yuen, Scuffling for a Slice of the Ringtone Pie: Evaluating Legal and 
Business Approaches to Copyright Clearance Issues, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 541, 542 (2006). 
 121. In re Cellco P’Ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363, 367–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 366. 
 124. Id. 
 125. ASCAP’s Opposition to AT&T’s Motion, supra note 109, at 12 (emphasis in original). 
 126. Id. at 17. 
 127. Id. at 18. 
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ASCAP argued that the Sony doctrine128 offers the Mobile Carriers no 
defense to secondary liability because the ringtones are not capable of 
“substantial noninfringing uses.”129 
1. Direct Liability for the Public Performance of Ringtones 
In its brief, ASCAP reiterated that it was appealing the court’s 
Download Decision, but it used the Download Decision’s reasoning in 
leveling its first argument.130 ASCAP contended that a ringtone is not 
merely a download.131 Ringtones are “capable of and designed for con-
temporaneous perception.”132 Because ringtones are often played as they 
are downloaded or are automatically played on completion, ringtones are 
not downloads in the Download Decision sense but are more akin to 
“streaming,” which was identified as public performance in the Preview 
Decision.133 
ASCAP argued that it does not matter whether the initial download 
transmission is perceived “publicly” because ringtones are ultimately 
designed for public perception.134 While a digital copy of the ringtone 
resides on the end user’s phone, the Mobile Carriers participate in the 
process of a performance of the work wending its way to the public.135 
Finally, ASCAP maintained that the Mobile Carrier triggers a pub-
lic performance when it uses its infrastructure to transmit a signal to a 
user’s mobile phone, causing the phone to ring.136 In sum, the Mobile 
                                                 
 128. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (“[T]he sale of copy-
ing equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory infringe-
ment if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely 
be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”). 
 129. ASCAP’s Opposition to AT&T’s Motion, supra note 109, at 26. 
 130. Id. at 12. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 14. 
 135. Id. In making this argument, ASCAP relied on National Football League v. PrimeTime 24 
Joint Venture, 211 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2000). In NFL, the court held that PrimeTime’s uplink of copy-
righted material in the United States required a public performance license even though the percep-
tion in question occurred in Canada—outside the jurisdiction of the Copyright Act. Id. at 13. The 
court stated that “a public performance or display includes each step in the process by which a pro-
tected work wends its way to its audience. . . . [I]t is clear that PrimeTime’s uplink transmission of 
signals captured in the United States is a step in the process by which NFL’s protected work wends 
its way to a public audience.” Id. (quoting David v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 697 F. 
Supp. 752, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the transmis-
sion of a ringtone to a mobile-phone user is a “step in that process” leading to a public performance. 
ASCAP’s Opposition to AT&T’s Motion, supra note 109, at 14. 
 136. ASCAP’s Opposition to AT&T’s Motion, supra note 109, at 17. 
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Carrier “commands, enables and controls the playing of ringtones on 
subscribers’ mobile phones.”137 
2. Secondary Liability for the Public Performance of Ringtones 
ASCAP argued that, even if the Mobile Carriers were not directly 
liable for an infringing public performance, they were secondarily liable 
for ringtone infringement.138 Secondary liability is used as a generic term 
to include both contributory infringement and vicarious liability.139 Con-
tributory infringement occurs “when ‘one who, with knowledge of the 
infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the in-
fringing conduct of another.’”140 Vicarious liability “attaches when one 
‘has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and also has 
a direct financial interest in such activities.’”141 
Under theories of contributory infringement and vicarious liability, 
ASCAP maintained that the Mobile Carriers affirmatively encouraged 
and promoted infringing activity while maintaining their mobile-phone 
infrastructures and deriving financial benefit from ringtone sales.142 
ASCAP pointed to particular marketing schemes that not only encour-
aged downloading, but also encouraged public performance.143 One such 
scheme encouraged users to “give your phone a personality,” while 
another compared the use of ringtones with the selection of nail polish 
color, asking, “Which ringtone will you put on today?”144 ASCAP also 
                                                 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 23. In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., the Supreme Court 
outlined theories of secondary liability for copyright infringement: 
One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, 
and infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exer-
cise a right to stop or limit it. Although the Copyright Act does not expressly render any-
one liable for infringement committed by another, these doctrines of secondary liability 
emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law. 
545 U.S. 913, 930–31 (2005) (citing Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434 
(1984); see also Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 62–63 (1911); Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. 
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. 
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A] (2005)) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court 
found Grokster liable for copyright infringement, holding: 
When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be im-
possible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, 
the only practical alternative being to go against the distributor of the copying device for 
secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement. 
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 929–30. 
 139. RONALD S. ROSEN, MUSIC AND COPYRIGHT 550 (2008). 
 140. Id. (citing Gershwin Publ’g Corp., 443 F.2d at 1162). 
 141. Id. 
 142. ASCAP’s Opposition to AT&T’s Motion, supra note 109, at 24. 
 143. Id. at 7. 
 144. Id. 
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claimed that the Mobile Carriers were contributorily liable for infringe-
ment by knowingly maintaining an infrastructure that allows the primary 
infringement to continue.145 In addition, ASCAP claimed that the Mobile 
Carriers were vicariously liable in failing to prevent the public perfor-
mances from occurring.146 
3. The Sony Doctrine 
Finally, ASCAP argued that the Sony doctrine offered the Mobile 
Carriers no defense.147 In Sony, the Court held that secondary liability 
could not be found if there were “substantial noninfringing uses” of the 
product in question.148 ASCAP argued that a copy of a member work 
could not be fairly compared to the Betamax videocassette recorder at 
issue in Sony.149 While in Sony the defendants sold a neutral product ca-
pable of substantial noninfringing uses, the Mobile Carriers distribute the 
actual musical work unlicensed for public performance to their subscrib-
ers.150 
Because primary liability must be present for secondary liability to 
occur, the arguments presented in this section rely on the notion that 
primary infringement occurs at the level of the mobile-phone user’s pub-
lic performance of a ringtone. To be sure, a performance of a ringtone in 
a public place “transmit[s] or otherwise communicate[s] a performance” 
to the public “by means of [a] device or process.”151 To avoid exemption 
under 17 U.S.C. § 110(4), however, the end user must be profiting from 
the transmission.152 ASCAP argued that customers enjoyed a “profit” in 
                                                 
 145. Id. at 25. 
 146. Id. at 27. 
 147. Id. at 26. 
 148. 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984). 
 149. ASCAP’s Opposition to AT&T’s Motion, supra note 109, at 26. 
 150. Id. 
 151. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 152. Section 110(4) states: 
[Infringement does not occur in a] performance of a nondramatic literary or musical work 
otherwise than in a transmission to the public, without any purpose of direct or indirect 
commercial advantage and without payment of any fee or other compensation for the per-
formance to any of its performers, promoters, or organizers, if—(A) there is no direct or 
indirect admission charge; or (B) the proceeds, after deducting the reasonable costs of 
producing the performance, are used exclusively for educational, religious, or charitable 
purposes and not for private financial gain, except where the copyright owner has served 
notice of objection to the performance under the following conditions: (i) the notice shall 
be in writing and signed by the copyright owner or such owner’s duly authorized agent; 
and (ii) the notice shall be served on the person responsible for the performance at least 
seven days before the date of the performance, and shall state the reasons for the objec-
tion; and (iii) the notice shall comply, in form, content, and manner of service, with re-
quirements that the Register of Copyrights shall prescribe by regulation. 
17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (2006). 
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the nonfinancial benefits from ringtone performances that they re-
ceived.153 ASCAP argued that because a customer benefits by purchasing 
a product and service she desires, she profits, and her use is ineligible for 
the nonprofit safe harbor of § 110(4).154 
C. The Mobile Carriers’ Case: A Ringtone Is Not a Public Performance 
In their motions for summary judgment on the issue of public per-
formance of ringtones, the Mobile Carriers sought to “define” and “clari-
fy” the scope of the right before proceeding to a rate-setting trial for the 
requested blanket license.155 The Mobile Carriers asserted that initial 
ringtone transmissions are downloads governed by the Download Deci-
sion.156 In addition, the Mobile Carriers asserted that no license is neces-
sary for alleged performances of a ringtone after its initial download.157 
The Mobile Carriers did not infringe ASCAP’s public performance rights 
in signaling phones to ring, nor were the Mobile Carriers secondarily 
liable for an alleged public performance carried out by the end user.158 
Finally, vicarious liability could not be found because the ringtones have 
substantial noninfringing uses.159 
1. Ringtones as Downloads Not Publicly Performed 
When Initially Transmitted 
The Mobile Carriers quickly disposed of the initial-transmission-as-
performance argument. They argued that ringtone downloads are essen-
tially the same as full-track downloads; thus, the Mobile Carriers accused 
any consideration of this initial transmission as a public performance to 
be relitigation of an issue already decided under the Download Deci-
sion.160 Like a full-track download, a ringtone download does not consist 
of a perceptible performance.161 Nor is a concurrent performance of the 
work possible because ringtone downloads take only a few seconds while 
the ringtone itself is usually approximately thirty seconds.162 The Mobile 
                                                 
 153. In re Cellco P’Ship, 663 F. Supp. 2d 363, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Memorandum of Law in Support of Verizon Wireless’ Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Ringtones at 2, United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 41-1395 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2009). 
 156. Id. at 6. 
 157. Id. at 8. 
 158. Id. at 14–16. 
 159. Reply Memorandum in Support of Verizon Wireless’ Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Ringtones at 15, United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 41-1395 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2009). 
 160. Id. at 2. 
 161. Memorandum of Law in Support of Verizon Wireless’ Motion, supra note 155, at 1. 
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Carriers flatly asserted, “There is no technological or legal distinction 
between the transmission of a download of a digital file embodying a 
complete song and the transmission of a download of a digital file embo-
dying an excerpt of a song for use as a mobile phone ringtone.”163 Be-
cause the Download Decision states that the download of a digital music 
file does not fit the statutory definition of “public performance,” no pub-
lic performance occurs in the initial transmission of a ringtone to a mo-
bile phone.164 
2. Necessity of a Public Performance License for a Ringing Phone 
Having addressed the initial-transmission issue by stating that it 
was essentially identical to the question presented in the Download Deci-
sion, the Mobile Carriers turned to the argument that subsequent perfor-
mances of the ringtone are infringing. The Mobile Carriers first rebutted 
the argument that they were directly liable for subsequent public perfor-
mances. Relying heavily on Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, 
Inc.,165 the Mobile Carriers maintained that the volitional act necessary to 
constitute direct liability for infringement is lacking in the instance of a 
mobile phone ringing.166 In Cartoon Network, the court held that media 
providers are not liable for making infringing copies when end users—
over whom media providers have no control—initiate the infringing dup-
lication.167 The Mobile Carriers relied on the language of Cartoon Net-
work, although they acknowledged in a footnote that the analysis they 
cited applies to infringement of the copyright holder’s reproduction right 
rather than performance right.168 The Mobile Carriers asserted that, simi-
lar to the media providers in Cartoon Network, they have no control over 
how or what ringtone the subscriber uses, how or when the ringtone is set 
                                                 
 163. Id. at 7. 
 164. Id. 
 165. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 166. AT&T Mobility’s Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Ringtones at 8–10, United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 41-1395 
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network that a cable systems operator had infringed the network’s public performance right by pro-
viding its subscribers with Remote Storage Digital Video Recorder systems (RS-DVRs). 536 F.3d at 
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plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is the customer, plaintiffs’ theory fails.” Id. at 
130 (emphasis in original). 
 167. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 133. 
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to ring, whether the phone is powered on, or whether the phone is taken 
to a public place.169 
3. Noninfringing Uses 
In the absence of end-user liability for public performance in-
fringement, the Mobile Carriers argued that they could not be secondari-
ly liable.170 The argument, therefore, hinged on the end user’s use being 
noninfringing. In arguing that a public phone ring is not a public perfor-
mance, the Mobile Carriers relied on the statutory exemption in § 110(4) 
of the Copyright Act.171 The Mobile Carriers argued that ringtones are 
not “transmitted” as required by the Copyright Act’s definition of the 
word.172 Rather than being transmitted, the ringtone “simply ema-
nate[s] . . . in the immediate vicinity of the phone.”173 Further, mobile-
phone owners receive no “direct or indirect commercial advantage,” as 
the owners do not charge admission to hear the ringtone or use the tone 
for some means of promotion or advertisement.174 If the court were to 
adopt ASCAP’s suggested rule, “it would be infringement to play a CD 
in one’s car while driving with the windows down or on the beach, or 
singing in the shower in a public gymnasium locker room.”175 Because a 
finding of direct liability in the mobile-phone user is contrary to statute, a 
finding of secondary liability cannot occur.176 
Even if a public ring constitutes infringement, the Mobile Carriers 
argued that the ringtones they market have substantial noninfringing 
uses.177 Private performances of the ringtone would be exempt from in-
fringement actions and, therefore, are noninfringing uses.178 As such, 
vicarious liability cannot be found under the Sony doctrine, where the 
Court held that there is no secondary liability when substantial nonin-
fringing uses are present.179 The Mobile Carriers cited a Federal Com-
munications Commission study that found that fourteen percent of adults 
in the United States have abandoned landlines in favor of mobile phones 
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as their primary phone line.180 As such, the Mobile Carriers claimed, it is 
highly likely that ringtones often receive private performances, relieving 
the Mobile Carriers from liability under Sony. 
D. The Court’s Band-Aid Solution 
The court had to grapple with conflicting interpretations of public 
performance in the Copyright Act. One interpretation comes from Na-
tional Football League v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture,181 the other from 
Cartoon Network L.P. v. CSC Holdings, Inc.182 
In NFL, the court held that PrimeTime’s uplink of copyrighted ma-
terial in the United States required a public performance license even 
though the performance in question occurred in Canada.183 Because the 
performance was outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. Copyright Act, the 
end use was, arguably, noninfringing.184 But the court stated: 
[A] public performance or display includes each step in the process 
by which a protected work wends its way to its audience. . . . [I]t is 
clear that PrimeTime’s uplink transmission of signals captured in 
the United States is a step in the process by which NFL’s protected 
work wends its way to a public audience.185 
Thus, PrimeTime was liable for a public performance even though the 
end use before the court occurred outside of the jurisdiction of U.S. law. 
Unlike the court in NFL, the Cartoon Network court held that media 
providers were not liable for public performance where end users in-
itiated the performance.186 The Cartoon Network court considered a 
claim by a cable television network that a cable systems operator had 
infringed the network’s public performance right by providing its sub-
scribers with Remote Storage Digital Video Recorder systems (RS-
DVRs).187 The cable subscribers—not the operators—used the RS-DVRs 
to create unique copies of the network’s programming for their enjoy-
ment.188 The court stated that an interpretation of the public performance 
right requires an examination of the potential audience of a work’s end 
                                                 
 180. Id. at 4 (citing FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, DA 09-54, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT & 
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use.189 Because a unique copy of the cable programming was created by 
and transmitted to individual subscribers, the court held that the perfor-
mances could not have been made “to the public.”190 
In applying this precedent to the Ringtone Decision, the court had 
to choose one of two interpretations. The court could have held that, sim-
ilar to NFL, when mobile carriers triggered a ringtone to sound, they 
transmitted a performance because they took the first step in a process 
leading to a copyrighted work sounding in public. Or the court could 
have held that ringtones were unique copies of works made for the en-
joyment of a single subscriber and, therefore, could not be public per-
formances. 
In bandaging together its decision, the court, for the most part, ig-
nored NFL by relegating the majority of its discussion of the case to an 
extended footnote.191 Instead, the court relied heavily on Cartoon Net-
work.192 The court’s choice of Cartoon Network’s “unique copy” analysis 
in the Ringtone Decision and disregard for the NFL analysis exhibits 
precisely the “band-aid” behavior to which Professor Litman refers.193 
In addition, the court could not craft a holding consistent with the 
normative underpinnings of U.S. copyright law because the creators of 
the works at issue were largely disassociated from the litigation. Because 
the vertical integration of the music industry has resulted in a handful of 
corporate interests owning both the mechanical reproduction and perfor-
mance rights in a majority of revenue-earning works, a vertically inte-
grated media corporation would have been unfairly advantaged by a 
holding for ASCAP. A favorable outcome for ASCAP would have pre-
sented a best-case scenario for such an integrated corporation: mechani-
cal reproduction revenue for the sound recording; mechanical reproduc-
tion revenue for the musical composition; public performance revenue 
for the musical composition; and public performance revenue for the 
sound recording. 
The court’s holding in favor of the Mobile Carriers is no closer to 
aligning copyright law with its normative underpinnings. The holding for 
the Mobile Carriers grants the mobile-telephone industry a windfall by 
allowing them to profit from the performance of copyrighted work with-
out performance royalty payments. It is true that Mobile Carriers already 
pay mechanical reproduction royalties for ringtones. But the current cop-
yright regime awards separate exclusive rights for reproduction and per-
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formance. Payment for one does not include the other. If the purpose of 
bifurcation of exclusive copyrights is to allow creators to reap much of 
the benefit from the exploitation of their creative work, then the Mobile 
Carriers should disgorge more of their ringtone profits. 
The Ringtone Decision acts as a harbinger of copyright reform for 
two reasons. First, the court adopts different interpretations of the Copy-
right Act in different contexts.194 And second, the Ringtone Decision 
shows how contemporary copyright litigation often inures to the benefit 
of copyright intermediaries while ignoring the creators that copyright law 
is intended to encourage.195 
IV. COPYRIGHT ACT REFORM 
The increasing vertical integration of the music industry has created 
a power imbalance between copyright creators and intermediaries. The 
Copyright Act is a relic of history created for the benefit of entrenched 
interests. Courts are increasingly challenged when called to apply the 
aging Copyright Act to new technologies unimaginable at the time of its 
drafting. The Copyright Act is ripe for reform. 
A. Imagining Reform 
Professor Jessica Litman asks us to imagine a Copyright Act un-
bounded from its prior realizations.196 Other scholars have joined her call 
for reform.197 The music industry is also calling for reform via the “carrot 
and stick” method of “graduated response legislation.”198 These calls for 
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identify user accounts that are used for infringement and inform the ISP. Id. The ISP sends the in-
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reform reflect the current dissonance between the Copyright Act and its 
normative purpose of creating incentives for authors to make artistic 
works. 
Regardless of the shape copyright reform takes, reform must be cer-
tain to rebalance the bargaining positions of songwriters and the music 
industry. Stronger authors’ rights that are tailored to the authors’ con-
tracting position will balance the authors’ interests against the collective 
dominance of the music industry. 
B. Rebalancing the Songwriter’s Bargaining Power 
The increasing integration of the music industry forces many sing-
er–songwriters to transfer their copyrights to one of four multinational 
media corporations in order to garner a record contract.199 We should be 
skeptical of arguments that stronger authors’ rights always create incen-
tives for songwriters to compose works. Because songwriters often trans-
fer those rights to a corporate entity, long and strong copyright protection 
often benefits multinational corporations more than songwriters.200 
One of the stated goals of the current Copyright Act and its term 
extensions is to keep the songwriter involved in her work and its perfor-
mance throughout her lifetime.201 A better statutory system would be one 
that keeps the creator of the work “in the loop” despite one-sided con-
tracting practices that result from the collective dominance of the music 
industry.202 An improved system would give the songwriter leverage that 
could yield an appropriate allocation of gain from new technologies, 
such as ringtones. More than any term extension, a copyright provision 
that increases the songwriter’s contract-negotiating power furthers the 
normative value of copyright as creative incentive. 
To strengthen the songwriter’s contract-negotiating power and reo-
rient U.S. copyright law toward its normative purpose, we should add 
                                                                                                             
fringing account holder a notice that she has been identified as an infringer. Id. If the infringer does 
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two provisions to the Copyright Act. Both provisions are inspired by203 
twenty-first century amendments to the German Copyright Act.204 
First, the U.S. Copyright Act should have a contract-reformation 
provision for instances in which a copyright transferee is disproportio-
nately benefited by new technology.205 New technology often offers new 
                                                 
 203. I say “inspired by” the German Copyright Act realizing that parts of German copyright 
law are inconsistent with U.S. copyright law, making a wholesale adoption of Germany’s statutory 
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§ 12.04(1) (3d ed. 2007) (“The history of international copyright protection shows that international 
standards ‘level up’ rather than ‘level down’: it remains to be seen whether the new standards 
adopted in Germany on the contractual position of authors and performers will, if generally accepted 
as fair and having been tested in practice, [] become the international norm in this area.”). 
 204. Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] [UrhG] 
[Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 1273, as amended by 
Gesetz [G], Oct. 26, 2007, BGBL. I at 2513 (Ger.). 
 205. This provision would be similar to Urheberrechtsgesetz § 32c. See 2 ADOLF DIETZ, GER 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE § 4[3][a][i] (2010). Professor Sterling summarizes 
2002 amendments to the German Copyright Act that strengthen the contractual stance of authors and 
performers: 
The new amendments clarify and strengthen the position of the author in respect of equit-
able remuneration for his work. The aim of the amendments is “to let authors and per-
formers equitably share in the returns and advantages from the use of their works”; for 
that purpose the legislator has introduced clauses to correct a remuneration not equitable 
from the beginning or to compensate for a conspicuous disproportion resulting from later 
uses of the works. 
 Some of the main provisions of the 2002 amendments may be summarised as fol-
lows: 
(1) Article 32(1) provides that if the rate of remuneration is not settled in the 
contract granting exploitation rights, the remuneration shall be at an equitable 
level. If the agreed remuneration is not equitable, the author may require from 
his contracting partner assent to alter the contract, so that the author is assured 
of an equitable remuneration. 
(2) Article 32(2) provides that remuneration is equitable if it is determined by 
a “common remuneration standard”. Article 36(1) provides that associations 
of authors may establish common remuneration standards with associations of 
users of works, or individual users of works. 
(3) Article 36(3) provides for settling of common remuneration standards by a 
mediation panel, set up in accordance with the provisions of Article 36(a). Ar-
ticle 36(3) also outlines the conditions on which reference to a mediation pan-
el becomes obligatory. 
(4) Article 32(2), second sentence, provides that, in effect, where there is no 
common remuneration standard, remuneration is equitable if it conforms at 
the time of contracting to what is regarded as customary and fair in business 
having regard to the type, scope, length, etc. of uses. 
(5) Article 32(3) is designed to prevent agreements to circumvent Article 
32(1)(2). 
(6) Article 32a(1) (the so-called “best seller” clause) provides that where the 
agreed consideration is conspicuously disproportionate to the returns and ad-
vantages arising from use of the work, the other party is required, at the de-
mand of the author, to assent to a change in the remuneration to ensure some 
2011] Copyright “Band-Aids” and the Future of Reform 1573 
revenue pools for artistic works. Ringtones provide an excellent example 
of this development. Because current contracting practices often involve 
the transfer of all copyrights to music corporations, a songwriter may be 
unable to enjoy revenue from newfound exploitation of her work. The 
Copyright Act must provide a safeguard for songwriters in these cir-
cumstances. Borrowing language from the German Copyright Act, a 
songwriter should be able to petition for the reform of a contract if the 
revenue the transferee corporation earns from exploitation of the work 
through new technology is “conspicuous[ly] disproportion[ate]” to the 
amount the corporation paid for copyright in the work.206 The reformed 
contract would ensure “equitable remuneration” for the songwriter.207 
Second, the U.S. Copyright Act should offer a limited reversionary 
right to the creator when a copyright transferee opts not to exploit the 
work through new technology.208 Corporations do not exploit every work 
in their catalogue with new technology because it may be cost-
prohibitive.209 A songwriter may wish to exploit his own work using new 
technology, but he is prevented from doing so because he has transferred 
exclusive use of his work to a corporation. If a corporate transferee does 
not intend to use new technology to exploit a work, the limited right to 
exploit the work with that technology should revert to the creator. 
While these ideas are mere seedlings, they do have the potential to 
keep the songwriter engaged in his work and encouraged to continue 
creating. The suggested amendments are closely aligned to the normative 
underpinning of U.S. copyright law to provide incentive to singer–
songwriters. As we enter a new period of copyright reform, we should 
search for opportunities to strengthen a songwriter’s negotiating stance 
against a vertically integrated music industry. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A court cannot reach an equitable result when it must decide which 
copyright intermediary should reap the benefits of the creative work of 
songwriters absent from litigation. New technologies, such as ringtones, 
unimaginable at the time of enactment of our current Copyright Act 
cause the Judiciary to stretch the narrow and inflexible text of the statute 
to its breaking point. Unsatisfactory decisions similar to the Ringtone 
                                                                                                             
further equitable participation. The situation where the exploitation right is 
granted by the other party to a third party is also covered by this provision. 
The claim for the change cannot be waived in advance (article 32a(3)). 
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Decision presaged the passage of the 1909 and 1976 Acts. Commentators 
predict that a similar wholesale copyright revision will occur in the near 
term. Statutory provisions strengthening the rights of songwriters should 
be included in the next Copyright Act. By implementing these provi-
sions, we can renew the bargaining power of the musical creator in an 
increasingly vertically integrated music industry. 
